Animals in the Original Position

to extend the coverage of whatever principles they adopt so
as to cover more than the class of moral persons~e.g. the
children they might be born as.
7 VanDeVeer,

Commenta,ry:
On the Utility of Contracts

p. 375.

8This orientation helps justify Rawls's demand for a thin
theory of the good, and a special emphasis on the primary
goods which enable a person to pursue her chosen life plans.
Elliot correctly notes that controversy rages about whether
Rawls is successful in avoiding "want-regarding principles";
however, he does not think that animals pose any
insunnountable difficulties in this regard (Elliot, pp. 103-104).
9 Regan,

Steve F. Sapontzis
California State University, Hayward
In many discussions that touch on animal rights, the
participants clearly feel they know the truth and proceed
to shape arguments to fit that truth. We owe Professor
Russow our thanks for a careful, thoughtful discussion
which has no axe to grind.
If I understand her argument, it runs something
like this.

The Case for Animal Rights, pp. 243-248.

10 Peter Singer, "Killing Humans and Killing Animals,"
Ethics, vol. 22 (1979), pp. 145-156.
11 It would seem that Regan's analysis of a "subject of a
life" is also meant to capture a sense of individuality, but one
which requires substantially less intellectual capacity than
Rawls's account of a moral person.
12 Rawls,

13 Elliot,

A. To understand whether participants in the original
position could be incarnated as nonhuman animals,
we need to understand what the original position
is supposed to accomplish.

pp. 505-510, passim.
p. 104.

B. The original position was set up in response to
Rawls's dissatisfactions with utilitarianism,
principally to overcome (what he believes to be)
utilitarianism's failure to respect individuality.

14Cf. Rawls, p. 142.
15Again, this is predicated on serious doubts about Regan's
analysis of a "subject-of-a-life". Cf. fn. 10.
16 VanDeVeer and Regan both discuss this point, although
it does not seem to be the major focus in either case.

C. Individuality, in the morally significant sense,
involves having and caring about a life-plan.

17 This comparison tacitly recognizes an additional
complicating factor that is not discussed in this paper: the
fact that being a moral person may well be a matter of degree.
I do not think this simplification affects the analysis of the
arguments under analysis here, since none of them mentions
this dimension, but it is dangerous to ignore it entirely.

D. Consequently, the participants in the original
position can be assured of being incarnated only
as beings capable of having and caring about lifeplans, so-called "moral persons," because only such
beings are the object of the original position exercise.

18 For more on this topic, see Michael Wreen, "In Defense
of Speciesism," Ethics and Animals, vol 3 (1982), pp. 47-60,
and James Lindemann Nelson, "Animals, Handicapped
Children, and the Tragedy of Handicapped Cases," Journal
ofMedical Ethics, vol 14 (1988), pp. 191-193.

E. Very few, if any, nonhuman animals are capable of
having and caring about life-plans.

F. Consequently, the participants in the original
position can be assured that with, at most, very few
exceptions, they will be incarnated as human beings.
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protection for individuals against being sacrificed for
the general welfare are concerns of justice no matter
what kinds of vulnerable beings are involved. The
hackneyed example of how a candy bar should be
divided among children-wheitller each should get an
equal share and equal pleasure or one should get all the
candy and all the pleasure-indicates that "having a
rational plan of life" is irrelevantto this criticism of
utilitarianism. There is a question of justice here and a
failure on the part of utilitarianism, if it cannot account
for the injustice of the inequi table distribution, but none
of this hinges on respecting rational life-plans, since
(with very few exceptions) eating candy has nothing to
do with life-plans.
If utilitarianism is indifferent to inequitable
distributions, the offense to our intuitive sense ofjustice
concerns some innocent individuals suffering or being
deprived while others enjoy most of the goods and
pleasures available and perhaps even prosper from the
others' loss. Appreciating the injustice of such
arrangements in no way leads one to emphasize the
ability to choose, carry out plans, or further purposes,
because lack of concern for the distribution of goods
need not involve frustrating choices, plans, or projects.
Even those who cannot choose, plan, and project, such
as young children and nonhuman animals, can receive
the short end of the stick when it comes to distributing
pleasures and pains. What a desire to overcome the
distributive shortcomings of utilitarianism inevitably
leads to, then, is not a procedure that respects just those
who have life-plans; rather, it leads to principles which
protect all those who might be sacrificed for the general
welfare against such sacrifice and which assure all
concerned that they will receive an equitable share of
available goods.
Such principles can be fonnulated without reference
to moral persons, except insofar as moral persons are
the sorts of beings to whom such principles are directed
in order to inhibit their tendencies to injustice. For
example, in Moral Philosophy, D. D. Raphael contends
that the principle of utility, "Do that which will lead to
the greatest happiness for the greatest number," already
contains a principle of distribution. The imperative to
seek happiness for the greatest number can be
interpreted as directing us to distribute happiness as
widely as possible. Alternatively, one could add to the
imperative to maximize utility Ilbe qualification that the
maximum that is compatible with equitable distribution
is to be chosen. Other, more complex alternatives

Thus, given the cOlmniunent to protecting individuality (as defined in C), a consistent theory of justice
which excludes most all nonhuman animals (and a few
marginal humans) follows.
The pivotal steps in Professor Russow's analysis are
the commitment to respecting individuality and the
definition of individuality in tenns of having a life-plan.
Both of these steps are, according to Professor Russow,
the result of Rawls's dissatisfaction with utilitarianism.
She tells us that "If one rejects utilitarianism in favor
of respect for individuality, one moves inevitably, as
Rawls does, toward a system which protects the
individual's ability to choose and carry out her own
plans, to further her own purposes."
That statement is obviously true, but trivially so,
since its being obviously true derives ft;om its employing
a definition of "individuality" which refers to having
life-plans. If one rejects utilitarianism in favor ofrespect
for those with life-plans, one will inevitably end up with
a system that protects those with life-plans. There cannot
be significant question about such a truism. The
significant issue is not what a rejection ofutilitarianism
in favor of respecting moral persons would inevitably
lead to but whether Rawls's criticisms of utilitarianism
would inevitably lead to defining individuality in terms
of life-plans and calling for the respecting of such
individuality. I do not find that that is where those
criticisms inevitably lead.
In section 5 of the first chapter of A Theory of
Justice, Rawls's criticism of utilitarianism focuses on
the lack of a principle of distribution in utilitarian
conceptions of justice: "The striking feature of the
utilitarian view of justice is that it does not matter,
except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is
distributed."(TOJ, 26) "This sum of satisfactions" refers
to "the greatest sum of satisfaction of the rational desires
of individuals."(TOJ, 25) Lack of a principle of
distribution permits the sacrifice of individuals in order
to maximize the general welfare and indicates a degree
of indifference to individuals. All this is very well-trod
ground and has, as Professor Russow notes, nothing in
particular to do with animal ethics issues.
It also has nothing in particular to do with respecting
beings having "a rational plan of life," Le., moral
persons. Although Rawls, like classical utilitarians,
clearly is only concerned with normal human beingsas evidenced by his reference to "rational desires"lack of assurance for individuals that they will receive
an equitable share of available goods and lack of
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guarantees ofjustice" is not itself prejudicial. Questions
about who is owed something ordinarily presuppose that
Ule benefit has to be earned or, at least, that it does not
follow from one's being able to benefit from something
that one should have it. However, matters of moral or
social justice and associated basic rights differ from
special rights and privileges in being guarantees that
one does not have to earn. So, should not the question
here be "Under what conditions can a being who could
benefit from just treatment be denied the guarantees of
justice?" Putting the question that way eliminates the
suggestion that one must earn the guarantees of justice
by doing something special, such as subscribing to a
contract. As William James says:

referring expliciUy to Rawls's insights concerning when
inequalities of distribution are equitable, could also be
formulated without referring to moral persons as the
exclusive beneficiaries of these qualifications (or
clarifications) of the principle of utility. The concern of
these principles of distribution would not be "Can they
choose?," "Can they plan?," or "Can they project?"
Their concern about the individuals to be protected
would still be "Can they suffer?"
Consequently, if the limitation of the concern of the
original position participants to the fate of moral persons
originates with Rawls' dissatisfactions with utilitar~
ianism, that is not because those dissatisfactions depend
in any essential way on what distinguishes moral
persons from other vulnerable beings. Rather, it derives
from the incidental fact that participants in Ulis debate
over the adequacy of utilitarianism have, by and large,
been concerned only with moral persons. Remarks
about obligations to other beings have generally been
relegated to footnotes, parentheses, and afterwords,
especially in the period during whichA Theory ofJustice
was being written, which predates Animal Liberation
by several years.
RawIs's own, brief discussion of possible obligations
to nonhuman animals occurs late inA Theory ofJustice,
beginning on page 504. On page 505, in response to
the question of "what sorts of beings are owed Ule
guarantees ofjustice," Rawls responds Umt "The natural
answer seems to be that it is precisely Ule moral persons
who are entitled to equal justice. [E]qualjustice is owed
to those who have the capacity to take part in and to act
in accordance with the public understanding of the initial
situation." Rawls goes on to indicate that moral personhood should be treated as a sufticient but not a necessary
condition for the guarantees ofjustice-presumably out
of concern about "marginal" humans-but it is clear
that in this contractarian approach to justice, those who
are entitled to the protection of principles of justice are
those who can and have agreed to abide by the contract
containing those principles: "Those who can give justice
are owedjustice."(TOJ, 510) That contractarian attitude,
I submit, rather than criticisms of utilitarianism, is Ule
basis for the elimination of nonhuman animals from
the guarantees of Rawlsian justice.
It follows that in addition to the sorts of criticism of
that elimination discussed by Professor Russow..
questions about that contractarian attitude are also to
the point. We can, for example, question whether the
question of "what sorts of beings are owed the
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Take any demand, however slight, which any
creature, however weak, may make. Ought it
not, for its own sake, to be satisfied? If not,
prove why not. (Essays in Pragmatism, p. 73)
Again, contracts ordinarily presuppose Umt all the
parties to it both have something to contribute to the
others and will benefit from entering into the contract.
On the other hand, many instances of moral and social
concern with justice involve situations in which one
party is at the mercy of the other. Here the principles of
justice are supposed to prevent the powerless from being
exploited with impunity by the powerful. In such
situations, the presumption of reciprocation that
underlies contracts-you are owed something because
you have given something-is out of place. The
powerless pose no Uueat to the powerful, and the
powerful would be better off exploiting the powerless.
Nonetheless, the exploitation of the weak by the strong
is unjust, is even a paradigm of injustice.
Does it not follow that contractarian constructions
of justice must inevitably fall short of providing a
complete theory of justice and that this shortfall
concerns not only marginal cases but a fundamental
moral and social concern with justice? Referring to
questions about "how we are to conduct ourselves
toward animals and the environment," Rawls
acknowledges Ulat "Ule contract notion" may not offer
"a way to approach" all "moral relationships,' (TOJ, 17)
but the shortcomings of the contractarian approach may
be much more important to an adequate tlleory ofjustice
Ulan has been acknowledged.
Finally, there are many examples of individuals who
are not parties to a contract being intended beneficiaries

231

Between the Species

Sapontzis: Commentary

of that contract. For example, many parents sign
contracts with day care centers to watch over and tend
to their children. So, is it so ''natural'' to believe that,
with only marginal exceptions, only those who
subscribe to a contract containing principles of justice
are to beuefitfrom the guarantees of justice? Even
though nonhuman animals cannot be parties to a
contract, it does not follow that they could not be
intended beneficiaries of that contract. Consequently,
if the participants in the original position can be
incarnated as any of the intended beneficiaries of the
contract they devise-a contract designed to overcome
the distributive shortcomings of utilitarianism-they
could be incarnated as nonhuman animals.

Replly:
Rawls: Rejecting
Utilitarianism Bind Animals
Lilly-Marlene Russow
As is his custom, Professor Saponztis begins his
reply with a masterful reconstruction of my basic
argument, the better to pinpoint the exact nature of our
disagreement. His reconstrucltion is entirely accurate
and fulfills its function admirably. It allows us to focus
directly on the key issue: the proper interpretation of
and justification for Premise C: "Individuality, in the
morally significant sense, involves [for Rawls] having
and caring about a life-plan."
In my paper, I argued that this premise could be
justified by Rawls's rejection of utilitarianism and that
it, in turn, justified excluding most nonhuman animals
from the original position. Sapontziscontends, in
contrast, that Rawls's rejection of utilitarianism is too
weak to support Premise C. He thinks that Rawls rejects
utilitarianism primarily because it lacks a fait principle
of distribution and argues that a demand for justice and
fair distribution does not yield any conclusions about
the relevance or importance of life-plans. He concludes
that Rawls's exclusion of animals springs from his
contractarian bent rather than from his rejection of
utilitarianism. If this is correct, Rawls's position is much
less interesting and plausible:: mariy arguments (most
notably, "marginal case" sorts of arguments) discredit
generally contractarian approaches from the outset,
while critiques of utilitarianism are more likely to
demand serious and sustained attention.
Sapontzis is correct in claiming that Rawls is
concerned about utilitarianism's apparent willingness to countenance unjust distributions; however, I
think Rawls's objections go beyond that. Another,
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